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t
Ever since 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt proposed to Congress
that "[a]ll contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any
political purpose should be forbidden by law,"' American political reformers
have been proposing to break the bond between special-interest money and
electoral politics by regulating the way candidates raise money to campaign
for elective office. Since Teddy Roosevelt's call, Congress has passed no fewer
than twelve different bills to reform the campaign finance system. The first
of these bills, the Tillman Act of 1907, was a direct result of Roosevelt's
effort.2 It sought to prohibit campaign contributions from corporations. In
addition to offering no provisions for enforcement, the Act nullified the intent
of its prohibition against corporate contributions by allowing individual contri-
butions from corporate stockholders and executives.
Subsequent reform legislation followed the same pattern: insufficient
provisions for administration and enforcement and sufficient loopholes to
undermine the regulations on campaign contributions. "More loophole than
law, they invite evasion and circumvention" is how President Lyndon Baines
Johnson described the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act3 and the 1940
Hatch Act4 which were ostensibly in effect during his term of office.5 The
same could be said about every other piece of campaign finance reform legisla-
tion to the present.6
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1. Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in THE THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA
63 (Albert B. Hart & Herbert R. Ferleger eds., 1941).
2. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
3. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25 (1925) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
591, 597, 599 (1988)).
4. The Hatch Act Amendments, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
594 (1988)).
5. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress (May 25, 1967), in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
DOLLAR POLITIcS 6 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter DOLLAR POLITIcs]; see also HOWARD R. PENNIMAN & RALPH K.
WINTER, JR., AMERICAN ENrERRISE INsr Cr MPAJIN FNANCE: TWO VIEWS ON THE POufrCAL AND CorNTru-
TIONAL IMPLICATIONS 6 (1971).
6. DOLLAR POLITICS, supra note 5, at 3-16, 23, summarizes this legislation. The first Publicity of
Political Contributions Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 and 18
U.S.C. §§ 591, 597, 599 (1988)), required national parties and interstate committees involved in House
campaigns to make post-election reports of campaign contributions. Lacking powers of verification and
enforcement, it proved meaningless. The Act was amended in 1911 to extend disclosure requirements to
Senate campaigns and limit House and Senate campaign expenditures. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37
Stat. 25 (1911). Again, there was no mechanism for effective enforcement. The Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, supra note 3, revised existing campaign finance legislation and served as federal law until 1971. It
changed House and Senate spending limits and mandated disclosure of expenditures and contributions by
candidates for the Senate and the House and for committees that sought to influence federal elections in
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Current campaign finance regulations are based on a series of reforms
enacted during the 1970s. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of
1971' and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971' authorized
a system of voluntary public financing for presidential elections funded by an
optional one-dollar check-off on income tax returns. Under this system, presi-
dential candidates who agree not to spend private money during the general
election receive public financing; candidates who reject public financing are
allowed to raise campaign money from private sources.
Coming in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the 1974 Amendments
to the FECA9 represent the boldest efforts at campaign finance reform ever
attempted. Although public pressure for reform was not organized, public
outrage against the excesses of the existing system was palpable. One public
opinion poll at the time indicated that sixty-five percent of Americans were
in favor of banning campaign contributions from private sources and adopting
a system of public financing.1" Although such broad reform was not enacted,
the 1974 law did extend public financing to the presidential primary, establi-
shing a system of federal matching grants for eligible presidential candidates
in primary races.11 For congressional elections, the law established contribu-
tion limits for individuals and political action committees (PACs). 2 It also
established spending limits on individual congressional campaigns, as well as
limits on the amount of money a national party could spend on a candidate's
behalf."' In addition, the law placed a limit on what individual contributors
could spend on an "independent expenditure." An independent expenditure is
a campaign expenditure by an individual or a political committee "expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made
two or more states. Because administration was vested in the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the
Senate, neither of whom had the statutory power of independent enforcement, the Act was routinely
ignored. The Hatch Act Amendments, supra note 4, limited campaign contributions to candidates and
national political committees, and expenditures of multi-state committees. The legislation applied to the
primary, as well as to the general election. However, individuals could give the maximum contribution
to multiple committees, each working for the same candidate. Again, the statute lacked an enforcement
mechanism. The War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 142, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), was passed over President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's veto. In addition to restricting workers' right to strike during the wartime emergency,
§ 3, it extended the prohibition of political contributions by national banks and corporations to labor unions,
§ 9. The Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947), made the campaign financing
restrictions of the War Labor Disputes Act permanent. The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178,
85 Stat. 497 (1971), the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat.
3 (1971), and the FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974), 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976), and 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979), are discussed
in the text.
7. FECA of 1971, supra note 6.
8. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 9002-9013, 85 Stat. 562-72 (1971).
9. FECA of 1974, supra note 6.
10. DOLLAR POLITICS, supra note 5, at 12.
11. FECA of 1974, supra note 6, § 408.




Democratically Financed Congressional Elections
without cooperation or consultation with any candidate" or a candidate's
organization or staff.' 4 To administer and enforce these and other provisions,
the law created a six-member Federal Election Commission (FEC)."
The 1974 FECA went into effect on January 1, 1975 and was immediately
challenged in the courts by an unlikely coalition of plaintiffs including the
conservative Republican Senator James L. Buckley of New York, former
Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy, the New York Civil Liberties Union,
and the right-wing publication Human Events. On January 30, 1976, in Buckley
v. Valeo,"6 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the limits on campaign contribu-
tions from individuals and political action committees" and the principle of
voluntary public financing for presidential elections. 8 But the Court struck
down limits on the amount of personal money candidates could spend on their
own campaigns, mandatory caps on the total amount candidates are allowed
to spend on their campaigns, and limits on contributions by individuals or
political action committees for independent expenditures, holding that such
restrictions were unconstitutional infringements of candidates' and contributors'
First Amendment right to free speech.19
The 1976 FECA Amendments2" attempted to bring provisions of the 1974
Act into accord with Buckley v. Valeo. In an attempt to control the amount of
money going into independent expenditures, the Amendments included a
provision mandating that individuals and political action committees spending
more than $100 to promote a candidate or party declare that the contribution
was made without the collusion of any candidate or party official. 2
The 1976 presidential election between President Ford and Jimmy Carter
was conducted under this system of total public financing. The public money
went directly to the national campaign committees of candidates Ford and
Carter, greatly diminishing local and state party activity on behalf of each
presidential candidate. To remedy this problem and encourage a revival of
grassroots political activity, the FECA Amendments of 197922 allowed local
and state political party organizations to raise and spend private contributions
for campaign materials and volunteer activity to promote their federal candi-
dates. This provision, though well-intentioned, resulted in the creation of the
"soft money" loophole. Presidential candidates who opted for public financing
could now spend, in addition to their public stipend, unlimited amounts of soft
14. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1988).
15. Id. § 208.
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id. at 104.
19. Id. at 24.
20. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
21. Id. § 104.
22. Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980).
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or "non-federal" money (i.e., money contributed by private individuals or
organizations to state or local party organizations which is not covered by the
regulations for federal campaign finance law). The existence of this loophole,
which is eagerly and unashamedly exploited by both major parties, nullifies
the prohibition on private fundraising by publicly financed presidential candi-
dates. Congressional candidates also raise and spend soft money gathered by
local and state political parties from private sources, thus minimizing the effect
of those FECA provisions upheld by Buckley that limit campaign contributions
from individuals and political action committees.2
The FECA reforms of the 1970s have been in operation for more than a
decade. We contend that they are conceptually flawed and have not achieved
their intended purpose. It is true that corruption is no longer blatantly accepted.
"Bag men" representing special interests no longer deliver bags of cash to the
members of Congress whom they seek to influence. The reforms of the 1970s
tightened the rules for disclosure and, in establishing the FEC, created an
administrative body to collect campaign finance data.
However, disclosure is perfunctory and enforcement lax. Not until well
after an election is over does the public learn the aggregate amount of money
individuals and political action committees spent on favored politicians.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics' FEC Watch, at the end of
1990 the campaign contributions of only one PAC had been audited for the
1989-90 election cycle, and sixty-five percent of the more than 250 enforce-
ment matters were still unresolved for that same period.24
More critically, however, the FECA reforms have done nothing to stem
the cost of running in a federal election and the amount of special interest
money that candidates for Congress are raising and spending. Indeed, since
1976, campaign expenses have increased far beyond the rate of inflation. In
1974, the total cost of all campaigns for the House and Senate was $77 mil-
lion.' In 1992, that cost had risen to $678 million-forty percent higher than
the cost of congressional elections two years earlier.26
Nor have the FECA reforms curbed political contributions by special
interest groups. In 1976, the combined contributions from political action
23. For discussions of soft money, see LARRY MAKINSON, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, OPEN
SECRETS, SECOND EDITION: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY AND POLITICS 16-17 (1992)
[hereinafter OPEN SECRETS]; JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, THE $43 MILLION
LOOPHOLE: SOFT MONEY IN THE 1990 ELECTIONS 10-11 (1991) [hereinafter $43 MILLION LOOPHOLE];
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SoFT MONEY '88 10-12 (1989).
24. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, FEC WATCH PROJECT, JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE DENIED:
THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT RECORD 1 (1992) [hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED].
25. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: A NEVER-ENDING
SPIRAL 2 (1988) [hereinafter NEVER-ENDING SPIRAL].
26. Federal Election Comm., Press Release, 1992 Congressional Election Spending Jumps 52% to
$678 Million (Mar. 4, 1993).
Vol. 11:333, 1993
Democratically Financed Congressional Elections
committees for all House and Senate races totalled $20.5 million.27 By 1992,
that figure had jumped to $188.7 million.2" These figures underestimate the
amount of special-interest money flowing into the campaign coffers of candi-
dates for Congress, for individual contributors often represent special interest
groups too. The amount of individual contributions far exceeds that of PACs-
in 1992 the ratio was almost 2: 1.29 The most recent congressional data, from
the 1992 elections, indicates that successful Senate incumbents raised 42.8%
of their money from individuals giving $200 or more, and only 17.3% in
contributions of less than $200.3' For successful House incumbents the num-
bers are 27.2 % for contributions of $200 or more and 18.5 % for contributions
under $200.31
Because of the inadequacies of FECA-mandated disclosure, it is difficult
to trace the special interests behind individual contributions. All available
evidence, however, indicates that the bulk of the money from large contribu-
tors comes from the financial reserves of wealthy financiers, corporate execu-
tives, real estate tycoons, lawyers, lobbyists and show business millionaires,
and not from the pockets of ordinary working-class and low- and middle-
income Americans.32
In addition to disguising the amount of individual contributions coming
from wealthy individuals with direct financial stakes in the deliberations of
Congress and the work of government, FEC data does not count substantial
soft money contributions, laundered through state and local parties for use by
individual congressional candidates. In the most comprehensive study of soft
money to date, the Center for Responsive Politics uncovered a total of $43.5
million in soft money contributions made during the 1989-90 election cycle
to the Democratic and Republican parties in just nine states.13 Business enti-
ties contributed over $16.3 million; individuals (many of them representing
27. NEVER ENDING SPIRAL, supra note 25, at 10-11.
28. LARRY MAKINSON, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, PACS IN PROFILE: INDUSTRY AND
INTEREST GROuP SPENDING IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS 2 (1993) [hereinafter PACs IN PROFILE 19921.
29. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
30. Id. According to Makinson's data, 14 members of Congress raised more than half of their
campaign contributions from individuals giving less than $200. OPEN SECRETS, supra note 23, at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 22-27. For example, the Center for Responsive Politics has identified 75% of the individual
contributors who donated more than $200 to congressional candidates in the 1990 election. Individuals
connected with the finance, insurance, and real estate industries were the biggest givers, accounting for
$16.5 million overall. Lawyers and lobbyists accounted for over $14 million. Individuals identified as
ideological contributors gave $5.9 million, with conservatives outgiving liberals $939,297 to $871,991.
Individuals identified as connected to organized labor gavejust $100,000. By contrast, individuals connected
to 13 separate corporate entities, including law and public relations (lobbying) firms, media and entertain-
ment, banking, investments, and wine and spirits (E&J Gallo Winery), gave over $100,000 per entity.
Individuals connected to Time Warner alone gave $337,800; those connected to the investment banking
firm of Goldman, Sachs & Co. gave $279,850. Id. at 26-27.
33. $43 MILLION LOOPHOLE, supra note 23, at 13. The states studied were Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas.
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business interests) contributed $14.9 million. Labor unions, by contrast,
accounted for just $2.8 million.34 Sixty-seven soft money donors in this study
contributed more than $100,000 to state and local party committees within the
nine states."
Soft money also includes contributions to national party committees for
mixed party activities on state and federal levels. According to the Center for
Responsive Politics, $83.4 million was given to the two major national parties
during the 1992 federal election, more than half of which represented contribu-
tions of $50,000 or more.36
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR MEANINGFUL CAMPAIGN REFORM
To reflect democratic values and make our electoral system conform more
closely to the principle of one person/one vote and to Abraham Lincoln's
cherished ideal of government of the people, by the people, and for the people,
a meaningful system of campaign finance reform must at a minimum:
(1) Eliminate wealth, or access to it, as a decisive factor in a political
candidate's electoral victory.
(2) Create a financially level playing field so that all qualified candidates
have equal financial resources to conduct competitive campaigns.
(3) Break the hold that wealthy individuals and other monied interests have
over the electoral and governmental processes.
(4) Relieve candidates from the burden of constant fundraising and enable
elected officials to spend more time on their public duties.
(5) Be free of loopholes. The history of campaign finance reform indicates
that piecemeal reform is ineffective. A single loophole can destroy reform.
A. Money Is the Key to Political Success
Despite the campaign reforms of the 1970s, the candidates who raise and
spend the most money continue to be elected to political office. In the 1992
congressional elections, for example, the winning candidates for election to
the House of Representatives spent an average of $543,599 while losers spent
an average of $201,263. 3' In Senate races, winners outspent losers by an
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 15-16.
36. JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SOFT MONEY, REAL DOLLARS: SOFT
MONEY IN THE 1992 ELECTION 1 (1993).
37. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE
1992 ELECTIONS 8 (1993) [hereinafter PRICE OF ADMISSION 19921.
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average of $3,930,638 to $2,034,980. 31 In these same elections, only forty-
seven House candidates and five Senate candidates spent less money than their
opponents and won.39
Money plays a decisive role in all stages of the electoral process. Indivi-
duals contemplating a run for office must first ascertain their chances of raising
enough money to wage a serious campaign. In earlier times, party bosses often
selected the candidate who received party support, as deals were cut in smoke-
filled rooms. By reducing the role of often-corrupt party bosses and regulating
the system of campaign finance, the FECAs of the 1970s put gatekeeping
power into the hands of political fundraisers and their network of wealthy
individuals and political action committees. Like the party bosses of old, these
large campaign contributors have become power brokers. By giving politicians
the necessary early money to organize their campaigns, they effectively screen
prospective candidates before the election even begins.
The high cost of campaigning and the access some candidates have to large
contributors discourages many qualified women and men from running for
office. Incumbents often amass huge war chests of campaign contributions in
one election in order to discourage serious challengers in the next election.' °
Yet, the ability to raise money does not necessarily reflect the required skills
of an accomplished legislator. Elections are the centerpiece of our democracy.
Ballots rather than dollars should be the determinant of political success.
B. Reform Must Create a Level Playing Field
Dependence upon campaign contributions from private sources encourages
noncompetitive elections. This is especially true in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives where, since 1974, the rate of reelection has been eighty-eight
percent and higher.41 Barring criminal malfeasance, once elected, members
can usually remain in office as long as they desire, or as long as they remain
in the good graces of their large campaign contributors. A decisive factor in
the advantage of incumbency is the ease with which incumbents raise money
to spend on reelection. In 1992, House incumbents spent 300% more than their
challengers.4 2 In the Senate, the difference between incumbents and challen-
38. Id.
39. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with the Center for Responsive Politics).
40. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, PRICE OF ADMISSION: CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE 1990
ELECTION 24, 39 (1991).
41. For reelection rates from the years 1974 through 1990, see OPEN SECRETS, supra note 23, at
5. For the 1992 election, see PACs IN PROFILE 1992, supra note 28, at 5.
42. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with Center for Responsive Politics). The dollar figure for the House of Representatives
was an average of $578,025 for incumbents and $169,207 for challengers. Between 1974 and 1986, the
spending disparity between House winners and losers ranged from 46% to 174%. NEVER-ENDING SPIRAL,
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gers was 400% ." Only a system in which qualified challengers and incum-
bents have equal financial resources (and enough financial resources to enable
the challenger to become as well-known as the incumbent) would create the
condition for fair and competitive elections.
C. Big Money Has Undue Influence Over Public Policy
Despite limits on campaign contributions, special interests pour millions
of dollars into candidate coffers, just as they did before the FECA reforms.
Figures for the 1992 election indicate that political action committees represen-
ting the finance, real estate, and insurance industries contributed $29.4 mil-
lion, 44 while the agriculture industry contributed $15.8 million and the health
care industry gave $14.8 million. Political action committees representing busi-
ness interests gave $127 million in 1992, while PACs affiliated with labor
unions gave $43 million.45 With health care reform on the top of the political
agenda, the contributions of the health care industry are rising above those of
any other sector: the American Medical Association (AMA), with its contribu-
tion of $3,237,153, was the leading PAC contributor in the 1992 elections.'
Health and insurance PACs contributed $3.9 million to congressional incum-
bents during the first six months of 1993, while contributions from all other
PACs decreased during the same period.47
Special-interest campaign contributions do not generally go to candidates
as a testament of the contributor's commitment to democracy. On the contrary,
special interests usually target their contributions to those candidates who sit
on legislative committees that deal with public policy of the special interests'
concern. For example, agribusiness interests give to incumbents on the agricul-
ture committee, construction firms give to members sitting on public works
committees, industries with pollution problems give to incumbents on environ-
mental committees, and so forth.48
Legislators often strive for a bipartisan consensus in policy legislation. But
supra note 25, at 16-17.
43. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with Center for Responsive Politics). For 1992 Senate races, incumbents spent an average
of $4,174,034; challengers spent $905,796. Between 1974 and 1986, the spending disparity between Senate
winners and losers ranged from 38% to 93%. NEVER-ENDING SPIRAL, supra note 25, at 16-17.
44. PACs IN PROFILE 1992, supra note 28, at 20.
45. Id. at3.
46. Id. at 9. The AMA was followed by the National Association of Realtors, the Teamsters Union,
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the National Education Association, the United Auto
Workers, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the National Auto Dealers
Association, the National Association of Letter Carriers, the National Rifle Association, and the American
Bankers Association.
47. Center for Responsive Politics, Analysis of Federal Election Commission Records (unpublished
analysis, on file with Center for Responsive Politics).
48. See, e.g., OPEN SECRETS, supra note 23, at 22-39; CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, PAC
CONTRIBUTION PROFILE OF THE HOUSE BANKING COMMITTEE (1991).
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when the two major parties are financed by similar, or the very same, special
interests, it is reasonable to question the basis for that political consensus. Too
often such a consensus is based not on the soundness of the legislation but on
a convergence of powerful monied interests who stand to gain from a particular
legislative proposal. At the very minimum, big contributors enjoy better access
to Congress than do individual voters. As former Congressman Michael Barnes
(D-MD) explained:
You have to make a choice. Who are you going to let in the door first? You get back
from lunch. You've got fourteen phone messages on your desk. Thirteen of them are
from constituents you've never heard of, and one of them is from a guy who just came
to your fundraiser two weeks earlier and gave you $2,000. Which phone call are you
going to return first?49
Campaign contributions influence Congress not only in terms of how
members vote, what issues they raise, what programs they push, and what fine
print they include in the bills, but also, as former Senator William Proxmire
has pointed out, in terms of what members of Congress do not do: in the issues
they do not raise, the speeches they do not make, and the influence they do
not exert.50 Most politicians aim to be responsible public servants, but their
need to raise money encourages collaboration with the special interest groups
and individuals who do business with government or are subject to government
regulation. This compromises the integrity of the legislative and regulatory
process.
D. Reform Must Free Politicians from Fundraising
In order to raise the $578,025 the average House incumbent spent to win
reelection in 1992, members of Congress would have to raise $5,666.91 every
week of their two-year term. In order to raise the $4,174,034 that the average
incumbent raised for a Senate election, Senators would have to raise
$13,378.31 every week of their six-year term.
Former Congressman Bob Edgar (D-PA) resigned from Congress in
frustration over the amount of time spent raising money. During an election,
he said, "[e]ighty percent of my time, 80% of my staff's time, 80% of my
events and meetings were fundraisers. Rather than go to a senior center, I
would go to a party where I could raise $3,000 or $4,000.""'
But challengers have a much harder task. While monied interests want to
give money to incumbents, they are reluctant to invest in a challenger unless
they are convinced that she has an excellent chance of winning. If they support
49. PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 101 (1988).
50. Id. at 49.
51. Id. at 119.
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a challenger who loses, they relinquish the privileged access that they have
developed with the incumbent-access that originated on the basis of campaign
contributions but that developed into a personal relationship, cultivated by
additional campaign contributions, down through the years.
E. All Loopholes Must Be Shut
Campaign contributions flow like a river. Partially damming a river does
not stop the water flow but merely forces the water to carve new channels. The
same thing has happened with campaign finance reform. Close one channel
for campaign finance and another one appears. As the soft money loophole
illustrates, one loophole can totally destroy the integrity and effectiveness of
campaign finance reform.
II. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In his inaugural address, President Bill Clinton spoke to the American
people about taking "bold" steps to "revitalize democracy": "Our democracy
must be not only the envy of the world but the engine of our own renewal..
. Let us resolve to reform our politics, so that power and privilege no longer
shout down the voice of the people. "52
On June 17, 1993, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of sixty to thirty-eight,
approved S. 3, the Campaign Finance Reform Bill of 1993." 3 The bill was
similar to the 1992 Campaign Finance Bill passed by Congress and vetoed by
President Bush. 4 At a news conference after its passage, President Clinton
called S. 3 "a vast advance over the present law in breaking the back of special
interest domination of politics and elections. " Despite the President's enthu-
siasm, however, it is doubtful that S. 3 will lessen the influence special
interests hold over the electoral process, even if it is ultimately passed by the
House. The Senate's Campaign Reform Act of 1993 does not, in our analysis,
meet the minimum requirements for meaningful campaign finance reform.
The centerpiece of the Senate bill is a voluntary cap on campaign expendi-
tures in the primary and general elections. The cap for the general election
would vary from $1.2 millon to $5.5 million, depending on a state's popula-
tion.56 (The cap for primary elections would be sixty-seven percent of this
52. The Inauguration; "We Force the Spring": Transcript of Address by President Clinton, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at Al.
53. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
54. S. 3, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
55. Beth Donovan, Senate Passes Campaign Finance by Gutting Public Funding. 51 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 1533 (1993).
56. S. 3, supra note 53, § 101.
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total.) 7 If adequately enforced, and if all loopholes were effectively closed,
S. 3 would limit excessive spending in some Senate races. (Senator Jesse
Helms, for example, whose $17.7 million led the big spenders in the 1990
Senate election, would be limited to $3.1 million under S. 3's population
formula.)" However, in almost forty percent of the 1990 and 1992 Senate
races, the actual money spent by the winning candidate was lower than S. 3's
allowable cap.59 In effect, the Senate has institutionalized the current high
level of campaign spending. And in regulating the amount of campaign money
rather than the source of campaign money, the Senate has missed the crucial
issue behind the need for reform. Under S. 3, the tie between political candi-
dates and special interest money will remain as tight as ever. Political success
will continue to accrue to those candidates who raise the most money, and
candidates will still have to spend exorbitant amounts of time raising money.
The major proposal before the House at the time of this writing, H.R. 3,
reflects the House's determination to freeze in place current political fundrai-
sing and spending practices. The spending cap that has the most support in the
House is $600,000, which, as we have seen, is more than the $543,599 that
the average House winner spent in the 1992 election.60
As of this writing, there is strong sentiment among Democrats in the House
for partial public financing of House elections (an idea rejected by the Senate).
In the House scheme, eligible candidates would be entitled to up to one-third
of the spending cap in communication vouchers to spend on advertising,
postage, brochures, and other outreach material, and the first $200 contributed
by an individual would be matched by federal funds.61 In many respects, the
proposal resembles the system already in place for the presidential primaries.
In theory, partial public financing guarantees every qualified candidate a
minimum amount of money to finance an election campaign. But the concept
of partial, as opposed to total, public financing does not assure a level playing
field for challengers and incumbents. Meanwhile, the time-consuming race to
raise private money will continue, as will the financial relationships between
political candidates and individuals and organizations that have wealth and
wield power.
The Senate bill and the House proposal reflect conflicting attitudes towards
political action committees. The Senate bill prohibits campaign contributions
57. Id.
58. OPEN SECRETS, supra note 23, at 2; Donovan, supra note 55.
59. Of the 50 Senate races contested in 1990 and 1992, the leading spender in 19 races spent less
than the allowable cap in the S. 3 reform. Donovan, supra note 55.
60. PRICE OF ADMISSION 1992, supra note 37, at 8; Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits
Nearing $1 million in '96, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3091 (1993) (once exemptions and inflation are
factored in, the cap may be closer to $1 million for many campaigns by the time the law takes effect).
61. Donovan, supra note 60, at 3093.
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from PACs.62 Incumbent members of the House, on the other hand, have
historically been more dependent upon PAC contributions than have their
colleagues in the Senate,6" and many oppose restrictions on PACs altogether.
At any rate, the focus on PAC money misdiagnoses the problem: a high
proportion of campaign contributions comes from individuals who, like PACs,
represent special interest groups." Furthermore, the rules of disclosure are
enforced more strictly for PACs than they are for individuals.65 The evidence
indicates that PACs in themselves are not a problem. Prohibiting or limiting
campaign contributions by political action committees would in no way dimi-
nish the influence that special interests wield in Congress by virtue of their
campaign contributions.
Spending caps are meaningless without the vigorous enforcement of all
regulations, and the existence of just one loophole is enough to destroy totally
the integrity of the reform. Neither S. 3 nor H.R. 3 completely closes the "soft
money" loophole.66 Soft money contributions to state political parties for use
by federal candidates remain a potential conduit for undisclosed private contri-
butions unregulated by the spending and contribution caps of the proposed
reforms.67
S. 3 and H.R. 3 merely refine the flawed concepts of earlier federal
election campaign acts. Reform legislation which does not separate special
interest money from the democratic process, create a level playing field, dam
existing loopholes, and anticipate new ones, is doomed to fail. A flawed
reform is often worse than no reform at all, for a reform that does not work
erodes public confidence, breeds cynicism about government, and encourages
the political apathy and alienation that already mark our political life.
62. S. 3, supra note 53, § 102.
63. OPEN SECRETS, supra note 23, at 6 (noting that House incumbents who were reelected in 1990
raised 48% of their money from PACs while incumbent Senators who were reelected raised just 22%).
64. Id. at 6, 22, 26-31. Senate incumbents who were reelected in 1990 raised 38% of their money
from large (over $200) individual contributors. The equivalent figure for members of the House of
Representatives was 24%. Executives with Wall Street investment firms, the film industry, and lawyers
and lobbyists gave most of their money as individuals rather than through PACs. Id. at 26.
65. The FEC has been lax in insisting that large individual contributors list their business and
organizational affiliations. As Makinson writes about individual contributions. "[uintil now, little has been
known about the details of that money-where it came from, who were the top contributors, and what were
the patterns by which it was dispensed." Id. at 26 (identifying and classifying by industry and interest group
75% of the $101 million given by individuals in contributions of over $200 during the 1989-1990 election
cycle).
66. In both the Senate and House bills, contributors can still give soft money to political parties for
building funds and non-administrative office costs. See S. 3, supra note 53, § 321; Beth Donovan,
Democrats Float Draft Bill, But Schedule is Slipping, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2940 (1993) (in the House
bill, state parties are also allowed to fund 40 to 50 percent of generic party activity in federal races).
67. Donovan, supra note 66, at 2940.
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III. DEMOCRATICALLY FINANCED ELECTIONS
The Working Group on Electoral Democracy has drafted a proposal for
Democratically Financed Elections to Congress that meets the criteria, as
described above, for meaningful campaign finance reform. To our knowledge,
it is the first detailed proposal for total public financing of both primary and
general elections that effectively eliminates campaign contributions from all
private sources. By using existing credit card technology and prohibiting all
payments for campaign expenses by cash or check, it would be easy to admin-
ister and enforce. Though drafted with Congress in mind, the proposal can be
adapted for presidential, state, and local elections as well.68
A. A Voluntary System
Democratically Financed Elections meet the constitutional requirements of
Buckley by making public financing voluntary. Candidates have the option of
rejecting public financing and raising campaign money from private sources
as they do now.
1. Publicly Financed Candidates
Candidates who voluntarily choose public funding must agree to accept no
private money during the primary and general election campaign period, accept
restrictions on the length and format of their television advertisements, and
appear in broadcast debates. In return for their compliance, qualified candi-
dates receive enough money (in the form of credit) to conduct competitive
campaigns in the primary and general election races, free media time on televi-
sion and radio, discount rates for additional broadcast advertising, and a
franking privilege for challengers to neutralize the advantage that incumbents
enjoy by their free use of the United States mail. Qualified candidates who
choose public financing are also eligible to receive additional financing to
match most expenditures of candidates who reject public financing. Publicly
financed candidates may also receive additional financing to match independent
expenditures directed against them.
Once candidates choose whether or not to accept public financing, they
must stick to that decision. Candidates who reject public financing for the
primary election cannot accept it in the general election. Similarly, candidates
who accept public financing for the primary cannot reject it for the general
election.
68. Legislation based on the Working Group's proposal for Democratically Financed Elections has
been introduced in the Maine legislature and is being prepared for introduction in Massachusetts, Missouri,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
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2. Privately Financed Candidates
Candidates who reject public financing would be at a disadvantage. Al-
though no limit can be placed on a candidate's use of personal wealth to run
for office, the proposal places a limit of $100 on all individual or organiza-
tional contributions and stipulates that all such contributions must be raised in
the district or, in the case of a Senate candidate, the state of the electoral race.
Privately financed candidates would also have to state in all their media ads
that they are financing their campaign through private contributions. Since
publicly financed candidates will be entitled to receive additional credit to
match most of the "excess" expenditures of privately financed candidates, there
would be little incentive for a privately financed candidate to pour excessive
amounts of personal wealth into a race.69
To prevent privately financed candidates from pouring money into their
campaign during the last two weeks (so that publicly financed opponents would
not have time to respond), the proposal requires that privately financed candi-
dates declare to the FEC two weeks before the end of the relevant campaign
period, the amount of money they intend to spend during the last two weeks
of the campaign.
B. The Primary Season
1. Seed Money
It takes money for candidates to "test the waters," to explore their potential
as candidates for elected office and to gather sufficient support to qualify for
public financing in the primary. For this reason, prospective candidates will
be allowed to raise a limited amount of private, pre-primary "seed" money
during the designated Public Financing Qualifying Period that will last from
the day after the general election to the day before the start of the formal
Primary Election Campaign Period. Contributions from adults residing in the
prospective candidate's state or district would be limited to $100 per candidate.
There would also be a cap on the amount of seed money a candidate could
spend.7" All contributions over twenty-five dollars would have to be reported
69. There must be provisions to protect the U.S. Treasury from being drained by extravagant private
campaigns. The proposal therefore sets a limit of 500% of the original line of credit that a publicly financed
candidate is entitled to receive in order to match the spending of a privately financed rival. Beyond that,
public opinion must play a role. Privately financed candidates who are willing to spend over five times
the amount of money that publicly financed candidates are entitled to receive will probably be criticized
by the media and the public for trying to buy the election and for being hostage to the special interests who
are supporting their profligate spending.
70. For a House race, the amount would be $15,000; for a Senate race, $15,000 plus $2,500 for
every congressional district in the state above one.
Vol. 11:333, 1993
Democratically Financed Congressional Elections
to the FEC under new rules of disclosure. A candidate would not be allowed
to use privately raised seed money during the primary and general election
campaign periods.
Some people, for reasons of health, family, or business responsibilities,
cannot volunteer their time in political campaigns but want to support candi-
dates of their choosing. The provision for seed money gives all citizens the
ability to assist their favorite candidates. The $100 cap on individual contribu-
tions diminishes the power broker role of special interests while enhancing the
influence of ordinary voters who, under this provision, can give money when
it counts for the important purpose of enabling their candidate to qualify for
public financing. Under Democratically Financed Elections, ordinary citizens
would pre-screen the candidates by providing them with the start-up money
necessary to run competitive campaigns.
2. Candidate Scholarships
In Buckley, the Supreme Court ruled that making financial contributions
to one's own campaign is a protected right of free speech. However, the
system, as it currently operates, discriminates against qualified candidates who,
because of their low income or the nature of their jobs, are implicitly preven-
ted from running for elected office. For these candidates, Democratically
Financed Elections will provide campaign scholarships during the primary and
general campaign periods. 7 These scholarships will go to challengers only;
incumbents, by virtue of their congressional salaries, will have the financial
resources to run for reelection. Many challengers will have families to support
and various payments to meet during the campaign season. Without financial
resources, they will not be able to leave their jobs in order to run for public
office. Wealthy people, by contrast, have investment income and bank accounts
in reserve. Many white-collar professionals, in addition to their savings and
investments, also remain on salary during their election run. Campaign scholar-
ships are thus essential to a fair and democratic election system. They are an
important means of ending the hold that the wealthy have over Congress and
other legislative bodies.
3. Qualifying for Public Financing in the Primary Election
Establishing eligibility for public financing is distinct from the process of
71. Candidate scholarships must have strict guidelines. The proposal suggests that a scholarship be
no more than $2,000 a month plus $500 a month for each dependent, to be paid only during the actual
primary and general election campaign periods. Eligibility for scholarships will be determined by a means
test established by the FEC based on the candidate's yearly income as determined from income tax returns
from the previous two years.
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qualifying for the ballot. Under current law, ballot access is an issue of state
law. Under this proposal, however, a candidate who passes state requirements
for ballot access must still pass a second, more difficult threshold to become
eligible for public financing. The purpose of this threshold is to measure the
potential of a candidate to win broad public support, not her ability to raise
large sums of money.72
To qualify for public financing in the primary election, candidates will have
to gather a specified number of low-dollar contributions from within their
district or, in the case of U.S. Senate candidates, within the state in which they
are running. These contributions represent a significantly greater commitment
on the part of the contributor than a mere signature on a petition to place the
candidate on the ballot. Each contribution must be accompanied by a signed
receipt fully identifying the contributor and indicating that she fully understands
the purpose of her contribution.
The amount of a Qualifying Contribution is, of course, subject to debate.73
We have set the figure at five dollars, which is low enough to be affordable
for even the poorest of citizens. The exact number of Qualifying Contributions
necessary to qualify a candidate is also debatable. While the requirements for
public financing should be low enough so as not to present a barrier to inde-
pendent candidates and candidates from new or insurgent parties, they should
be high enough so that all candidates are forced to stretch beyond their imme-
diate circle of supporters. Certainly, if the number of Qualifying Contributions
is set low, some eccentrics are going to meet the threshold of eligibility. In
areas of the country where extremism is a powerful force, extremist candidates
will qualify for public money-as well they should. Democracy, by its very
nature, is a messy affair. Better that a few David Dukes get public money
because they can prove popular support than have good candidates impeded
in their efforts to run serious campaigns because, despite public support, they
lack access to large sums of money. Under the current system, a few wealthy
backers can transform an otherwise marginal politician into a serious candidate.
Wealthy individuals with no other qualification than a willingness to spend
their own personal money can become serious candidates as well. In contrast,
the proposed system emphasizes the number of contributions rather than the
amount of money collected.
The proposal for Democratically Financed Elections sets the number of
Qualifying Contributions at 1,000 per congressional district. Senate candidates
would be required to raise 1,000 Qualifying Contributions plus an additional
72. This qualification, because it involves federal money, can be regulated by Congress. It is similar
to the current system of partial public financing of the presidential primary-a system that has already been
found constitutional. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 104 (1976).
73. Indeed, all the numbers offered in this proposal are suggested figures. Because the concept of
total public financing of primary and general elections has never been attempted, there is no empirical data
on which to base our numerical assumptions.
348
Vol. 11:333, 1993
Democratically Financed Congressional Elections
250 Qualifying Contributions for every congressional district in their state.
4. Public Financing of the Primary Election
Party candidates who raise the required number of Qualifying Contributions
will each get an equal amount of public money (receivable as a line of credit)
for the primary campaign. The proposal allows $100,000 for each eligible
House candidate. Each Senate candidate is allotted $100,000 plus an additional
$50,000 for each congressional district in the state above one. Again, as with
all our numbers, these figures are open to debate.74 The amount of credit
candidates receive should be sufficient to enable challengers to run competitive
races against better-known incumbents.
The primary election serves a dual function under Democratically Financed
Elections. Not only does it determine a party's candidate in intra-party compe-
tition, as it does at present, but it also provides a fast-track qualifying test for
candidates of new or third parties. Third-party candidates would become
eligible for public financing in the general election if, as explained in the next
section, their party received a qualifying percentage of the total vote cast in
the primary.
Making the primary a qualifying test for public financing will make
primary elections more interesting for the public and more competitive for the
candidates. Heavily favored candidates in traditional one-party districts will,
under this system, have to run hard in the primary if only to prevent new
parties from establishing their eligibility for public financing. Whether a state
has a closed primary or an open one is not important under this system. In
each case, political parties will have an interest in maximizing their vote. A
party candidate with weak or no primary opposition must still get enough
supporters to the polls to meet the qualifying threshold for public financing in
the general election. An unopposed party candidate who raises enough Quali-
fying Contributions to become eligible for public financing in the primary will
have the same resources as the individual candidates in an exciting and tightly
contested primary.
74. Data breaking down campaign expenditures are sparse. One study shows that House candidates
in 1990 spent an average of 17.69% of their expenditures on fundraising and Senate candidates spent
30.8 %. SARAH FRITZ & DWIGHT MORRIS, HANDBOOK OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE 1990 CONGRESSIO-
NAL RACES 8-9 (1992). Publicly financed candidates will not have to spend any money for fundraising.
In addition, their media costs will be reduced.
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C. The General Election
1. Qualifying for Public Financing
While it is the individual candidate who must establish her eligibility to
receive public financing in the primary election, it is the political party that
has to establish eligibility for its candidate in the general election, with the
winner of each party's primary receiving the public funds. This is an important
distinction that seeks to balance the role of political parties with that of indivi-
dual candidates. Rival candidates in a party primary will still want to beat one
another out for their party's nomination, but they will also want to maximize
the vote of their party to prevent primary candidates from new or third parties
from gaining enough votes in the primary to establish their eligibility for public
financing in the general election.
The mechanism by which a party establishes its eligibility for public
financing in the general election is the Combined Party Vote. This represents
the total of votes cast for all candidates competing in the primary. The winning
candidate of a party whose candidates receive a combined party vote of more
than 20% of the total vote cast in the primary election would qualify for full
public financing in the general election. For example, if a party has two candi-
dates in its primary and one candidate gets 14% of the total vote and the other
candidate gets 7 % (neither of which would qualify them individually for public
financing), their combined party vote would be 21 %, enabling the party to
qualify for full public financing, with the money going to the winning candi-
date who got 14% of the vote.
For the general election, the proposal allocates $150,000 for a candidate
for the House of Representatives. Each Senate candidate is allotted $150,000
plus an additional $75,000 for each congressional district in a state above one.
Winning primary candidates of a party whose combined party vote is between
five and twenty percent would receive a proportional amount of public finan-
cing.75
2. Independent Candidates
Although Democratically Financed Elections are biased toward a strong
75. For example, a candidate of a party whose candidates together receive 10% of the total popular
vote in the primary election would be entitled to 50% of total public financing since 10% is one-half of
20%, and so on. Publicly financed primary candidates whose political parties qualify for proportional public
financing in the general election are prohibited from raising and spending any additional money from private
sources. As these candidates would be receiving proportional media benefits and mass mailing privileges,
they would have the resources, without the addition of private money, to wage campaigns that reflect their
proven public support.
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and cohesive party system, the plan does not unduly discriminate against
independent candidates who run without an affiliated political party. Indepen-
dent candidates do not run in the primary election. In order to qualify for
public financing in the general election, they collect Qualifying Contributions,
like all other candidates, but must collect a higher number than candidates who
represent political parties. The number must be high enough to dissuade
individual candidates from abandoning their party affiliation so that, by running
as independents, they can jump directly into the general election. We suggest
that an independent candidate must raise, during the Public Financing Quali-
fying Period, at least 125 % of the number of qualifying contributions required
of a party candidate to qualify for public financing in the primary election.
Independent candidates who meet the 125 % threshold would receive full
public financing for the general election. However, without an opportunity to
make their name and views known during the primary election, they would
be at a disadvantage against candidates who had public financing in the primary
as well as the general election. To enable an independent candidate to cam-
paign actively during the primary election period, the proposal offers them the
possibility of obtaining proportional public financing for that period. Thus,
independent candidates who raise 150% of the threshold for qualifying contri-
butions would get half of what party candidates get in the primary election,
while those who raise 175% would get three-quarters the amount. Those
independent candidates who raise twice the number of qualifying contributions
would get full public financing in the primary election.
3. Political Parties
All campaign finance laws have an impact on political parties. The current
system of privately financed campaigns, for example, has greatly weakened
the party system.76 Individual candidates no longer need to look to their party
for support. More important than the identification of party affiliation is the
money candidates get from non-party financial sources. By prohibiting cam-
paign contributions from private sources, our proposal weakens the tie between
special interests and political candidates. In so doing, it strengthens the tie that
binds political candidates to political parties.
As private associations, parties can, of course, raise private money. Requi-
ring political parties to accept only public financing would therefore be uncon-
stitutional-and undesirable. It is true that providing public financing to
political parties for general campaign expenditures would assure that all
76. See BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS
296 (1988); LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S
FUTURE 71-75 (1988).
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qualified parties-even those without financial backing from wealthy interests-
have some operating capital to conduct electoral campaigns. But public finan-
cing of political parties would greatly add to the expense of publicly financed
elections and complicate administration. Furthermore, as parties have the right
to raise private money, public financing of political parties would not sever
the connection between politics and private special interest money-it would
merely allow parties to collect public money in addition to what they get from
special interest sources.
For the sake of simplicity and economy, this proposal rejects public finan-
cing of political parties. Instead, in order to lessen the tie between politics and
private money, it places a limit of $100 on the amount an individual or an
organization can give to a national political party.
Because of the potential for abuse,' national parties will not be able to
pass money to individual candidates. Yet, because it is desirable that parties
have some influence over their candidates, national parties would be able to
transfer money to state and local parties to finance in-kind expenditures on
behalf of individual candidates up to a value not to exceed ten percent of the
amount the individual candidate receives in public financing. This provision
Would enable parties to give valuable in-kind support to candidates who adhere
to the party's platform and policy. This provision would encourage party-
financed grassroots activity, such as get-out-the-vote drives, organizing volun-
teers for informational canvassing, the staffing of phone banks, and the distri-
bution of buttons, lawn signs and other campaign paraphernalia, which repre-
sent legitimate in-kind activities. It would be against the law, however, to use
party money to finance a candidate's media advertising.
The crucial point of this provision is to grant political parties a means to
influence individual candidates. For example, candidates who win a party's
nomination but do not follow the party's program may, at the discretion of the
party, not get their party's assistance, while candidates who do follow the party
program may, at the party's discretion, get additional help. Similarly, candi-
dates in a tight race may get more assistance than candidates who are sure
winners or sure losers. Which candidates receive national party assistance is
determined by negotiations between the candidates and national, state, and
local party officials. The influence thus acquired is minor, however; the
assistance is worth no more than ten percent of what a candidate is otherwise
eligible to receive in public finance credit. As this advantage is based on the
relationship between candidates and a political party rather than on the relation-
ship between candidates and their ability to raise special interest money, the
compromise does not violate the goal of severing the connection between
77. For example, a corporation or organization might collect $100 contributions from all of its
members and give the bundle of checks to a political party, making it clear that, although the checks are
signed by individuals, the money represents a contribution by the institutional entity.
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public politics and private money. To the degree that this provision strengthens
the role of political parties at the expense of special interest money, the minor
tilting of the playing field is, we believe, worth it.
D. Educating Voters
1. Voter Information
To assure that each voter has, at a minimum, the basic facts of a candi-
date's ideas and positions, the proposal for Democratically Financed Elections
will require that the Federal Election Commission provide grants and establish
guidelines for Voter Information Programs in each state. Such programs will
be administered by non-partisan voter education groups, members of the
media, representatives of political parties, and other interested citizens.
Voter Information Commissions would be authorized to organize and
sponsor candidate debates, allocate broadcast time under the provisions for free
media, and research, publish, and distribute by mail Voter Information Packets
to include biographical material from each candidate, statements by the candi-
dates on designated issues, and the voting record, when pertinent, of every
candidate. The goal of the commissions would be to serve the public as an
objective complement to the efforts of the candidates' own personal campaigns.
In no way should Voter Information Programs infringe on the First Amend-
ment rights of the candidates by regulating the quality, style, or content of a
candidate's public presentation.
2. Franking
Incumbents have a large advantage over their challengers because of the
congressional franking privilege. Rather than curbing this privilege, as some
have proposed,78 we would extend it to those challengers who have qualified
for public financing. All such candidates would be eligible to send one free
mailing to all the residents in their district or state during the primary election
and again during the general election campaign. Candidates of political parties
who have qualified for proportional public financing would be entitled to this
same minimal right. While incumbents could still send out franked mail in
reply to constituent letters and use their franking privilege to conduct other
normal business, they would only be allowed these two mass mailings during
the formally-designated primary and general campaign periods. Both incum-
bents and challengers would, of course, be allowed to send out other campaign
mailings at the regular cost.
78. As currently drafted, only the Senate bill bans franking. S. 3, supra note 53, § 715.
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3. Free Media
Free media for political candidates is commonplace in other countries.
According to one recent study, "the United States is the only developed democ-
racy which does not offer this type of support to parties or candidates. "79 But
the idea that television and radio should provide free time for political pro-
gramming has long been considered an important component of campaign
reform. The ideas presented here are not new and can be promoted indepen-
dently of the proposal for Democratically Financed Elections. 0 The legal
rationale for free media is based on the Communications Act of 1934, which
asserts government ownership of the airwaves, and in particular on Section
301(a), which requires that broadcast licenses promote the "public interest,
convenience and necessity."8" The requirement that broadcast stations set
aside time for public service announcements is a precedent for the idea that
broadcast stations should set aside time for political announcements. As the
Center for Responsive Politics has stated, broadcasters have a hybrid status:
"they possess private rights, but public responsibilities."82 This is not to say
that broadcasters, politicians, political parties, public interest groups, and other
interested parties will not hesitate to challenge these provisions in court.3 But
we contend that existing law allows the government to require broadcast
stations to set aside time for political programming. 4
Under the proposal for Democratically Financed Elections, publicly
financed candidates will be allotted free media time in one- to five-minute slots
on the following basis:
(a) House candidates will receive fifteen minutes for the primary and thirty
minutes for the general election campaign.
(b) Senate candidates will receive thirty minutes for the primary and sixty
minutes for the general election campaign.
(c) Candidates of parties that qualify for a proportional amount of public
financing in the general election would get one-half the free media time allow-
79. THE CENTER FOR A NEW DEMOCRACY & THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, THE WORLD
OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE FUNDING OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONS 7-8 (1993).
80. See, e.g., THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTER'S TIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA (1969) [hereinafter ELEC-
TRONIC ERA]; THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, BEYOND THE 30-SECOND SPOT: ENHANCING THE
MEDIA'S ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS (1988) [hereinafter 30-SECOND SPOT].
81. 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 315(a) (1988) ("the obligation imposed upon [broadcasters] under this
chapter to operate in the public interest"); see also 30-SECOND SPOT, supra note 80, at 24-25.
82. 30-SECOND SPOT, supra note 80, at 25.
83. See, e.g., Senate Campaign Finance Proposals of 1991: Hearings on S. 3, S. 6, S. 7, S. 53, S.
91, S. 128, S. 143, S. 294 and S. Res. 70 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 233-253 (1991) (Memorandum submitted by National Association of Broadcasters).
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ance of party candidates who qualify for the full public financing.
4. Problems of Free Media
Free media raises complex but not unsurmountable logistical problems.
Urban glut, for example: How do TV stations provide free media in urban
areas that incorporate many congressional districts? One solution would be to
limit the free media time any one TV station has to provide during the cam-
paign period and divide the races between the available stations. Thus, if New
York had twenty stations to cover its forty races, each station would cover two
races. Another solution would be to exempt areas where urban glut is a
problem and make alternative provisions. For example, in a city like New
York where television advertising in congressional races has not been impor-
tant, candidates might give up their right of free media for an additional
franking privilege.85
In addition to worrying about urban glut, broadcasters are reluctant to
interrupt or drop prime-time programs for political messages. Viewers do not
like to see their favorite programs interrupted for political ads. In 1970, the
FCC set aside a "prime-time access period" between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00
p.m.-after the evening news but before the network shows-for public service
programming." If, for a few weeks during the primary and general election
periods, television stations were required to set aside this half-hour period for
free media programming, the problem would be solved and the public would
have a definite time of day in which to tune in (or tune out) political discus-
sion. The Voter Information Commissions in the various states would have the
authority to regulate the system of free media to suit local needs and traditions.
5. Guaranteed Advertising Rates
Candidates who qualify for public financing would also be entitled to
purchase advertising time, in blocks of one minute or more, on all radio and
television stations at rates not exceeding the rates charged to other customers
during the time period when the candidate ads are scheduled to be broad-
cast.17 To receive this guaranteed rate, candidates would have to appear in
person on TV and use their own voice on radio for at least fifty percent of the
broadcast time. Some will object that this regulation violates a candidate's right
to free speech, and the objection is well taken.8" Campaign finance law
85. For a discussion of urban glut, see id. at 47-57.
86. Id. at 57-58. See also ELECTRONIC ERA, supra note 80, at 33.
87. A similar provision for discount media rates is included in the Campaign Finance Reform Bill
of 1993, S. 3, supra note 53, § 131.
88. See, e.g., Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating
Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663, 667-70 (1992).
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should not seek to regulate the substance of candidate ads nor should it impose
a subjective value of what constitutes quality advertising. Precedent for regula-
ting political advertisingformat-as opposed to political advertising substance-
is established, however. Currently, campaign advertisements are required to
include a tag line identifying the committee paying for the advertisement.
Candidates who choose to raise their money from private sources would not
have to adhere to the mandated format. They would, however, have to provide
a tag line declaring that the advertisement was paid for by campaign contribu-
tions from private sources.
E. Enforcement
1. Soft Money
Because this proposal governs federal elections, it cannot regulate private
contributions to state political parties. At present, contributions to state parties
are routinely used to evade federal regulations. Soft money represents cam-
paign contributions that are, in effect, laundered by state parties for use in
federal campaigns. The proposal for Democratically Financed Elections closes
this loophole by prohibiting a candidate from spending money that does not
come through the FEC-administered credit card system. As an added prohi-
bition, it requires that any candidate expenditure mentioning a federal candi-
date, even if it is part of an expenditure extolling the merits of the state party's
ticket, must come from the federal candidate's publicly financed line of credit.
2. Enforcement by Credit Card
Democratically Financed Elections will be relatively easy to enforce.
Eligible candidates who agree not to accept or spend private money will
receive not money but credit from a federal account regulated by the Federal
Election Commission and administered, under contract to the FEC, by an
existing credit card company. Each candidate and designated staff members
will receive a special FEC "Fair Election" Credit Card (much like a VISA or
Mastercard) with which they will make all campaign purchases and pay their
bills. It will be a violation of the law to pay cash or by check for any major
expense relating to the election, and all payments, except utility bills, will have
to be made at the time of purchase. Upon completing a sale, the vendor will
be required to report the sale to the credit card company just as it would if it
were processing a VISA account, and the credit card company will deduct the
expenditure from the candidate's line of credit. With one telephone call the
treasurer of a campaign will be able to keep a daily record of the candidate's
credit balance just as credit card customers can keep daily records of their own
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credit card balance now.
The advantages of the credit card system are simplicity, convenience, and
easy and instant monitoring and enforcement. Under the current system,
candidates have to hire bookkeepers, lawyers, and accountants just to deal with
the FEC's disclosure forms, and the FEC's staff has to enter all the data on
the forms into its computer system. Under the proposed credit card system,
there will be no contributions to monitor once the primary campaign period
gets started, and all the credit card expenditures can be easily downloaded into
the FEC's computers. Under the current system, the FEC has neither the
authority nor the resources to audit individual candidate campaigns." Candi-
dates who are proven to have violated the campaign finance laws can negotiate
a settlement, a process that can take many months and even years, and is
rarely reported in the press.9 As monetary settlements usually represent a
small percentage of the campaign money that was illegally raised and spent,
bending or ignoring the rules is tempting.9 Under the proposed system, two
simple regulations are needed to guard against violations of campaign finance
rules. Any candidate who makes payment for a campaign expense by any
means other than with the credit card is guilty of a violation, and any candidate
who uses public money for personal use or gain is guilty of criminal fraud.
The use of credit card technology will make monitoring fraudulent campaign
expenditures easy.
The few complexities inherent in this credit card system do not compromise
its actual effectiveness. The proposal provides an allowance for the spending
of petty cash for meals, snacks, newspapers, phone calls, and other minor
necessities of an election campaign. Payment for big budget items (e.g., media
advertising, staff, consultants, travel, office expenses, polling, printing,
mailing, etc.) would be by credit card at the time of purchase. In budgeting
projected expenses, candidates would have to estimate the cost of utilities. The
FEC could provide a formula for such estimates and, in cooperation with
telecommunications companies, develop a means for the daily monitoring of
candidates' bills. The enforcement mechanism would seek to balance flexibility
with caution. The credit card system should deal only with important campaign
expenses.
The existence of absolute spending limits creates the need for candidates
to adhere to a strategic spending plan. Once campaigns have exhausted their
line of credit-even if it occurs weeks before the end of the campaign-candi-
89. JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 24, at 12.
90. Id. at 13-15.
91. For example, in the 1984 presidential election, the FEC questioned the legality of $3 million in
privately raised money that was spent by the "Reagan-Bush '84" campaign committee. In April 1990, more
than five years after the suspect expenditure was made and over a year after President Reagan had left
office, Reagan's campaign committee acknowledged its violation of the law and agreed to a fine of $2,500,
a small price, indeed, for the $3 million illegally but effectively spent. id. at 17-18.
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dates cannot spend any more money for their election. Under this system,
candidates would have to budget carefully-a useful discipline for prospective
legislators.
3. Independent Expenditures
One potential hemorrhaging point remains: that of money spent by private
citizens or independent political groups on behalf of a candidate without the
candidate's participation or knowledge. Buckley shields these independent
expenditures as protected free speech. 92 It is likely that under the system of
Democratically Financed Elections, independent expenditures will become a
channel by which special interest groups spend money to support or oppose
particular candidates. Barring a successful challenge to Buckley, this proposal
cannot prohibit independent expenditures; it can only discourage or offset their
use as a campaign tactic. To do this, the proposal requires that individuals and
organizations planning to make an independent expenditure notify the FEC
within forty-eight hours after the expenditure is made, indicating in a sworn
affidavit which candidates their expenditure is intended to oppose or support.
This disclosure would free an additional amount of credit, equivalent to the
cost of the independent expenditure, for use by the targeted candidates. Those
planning to make independent expenditures during the last two weeks of the
campaign must, before the final two-week period begins, notify the FEC of
their intention, submit the above affidavit, and declare the amount of money
they intend to spend during the last two weeks of the campaign. By providing
additional credit to candidates who are targets of independent expenditures,
Democratically Financed Elections should effectively deter their use.
F. Cost of Democratically Financed Elections
Because Democratically Financed Elections represents a new concept of
reforming campaign finance law, it is impossible to predict absolutely its cost
to the taxpayer. A generous estimate would place the cost of total public
financing of both the' primary and general election at under $500 million a
year, or less than five dollars for each federal taxpayer.93
92. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976).
93. This figure is based on the following assumptions:
Congressional Primary: Every two years, 435 House seats are contested. We estimate three primary
candidates for each party for each seat, and a seventh candidate reflecting an eligible third party. Each
candidate gets $100,000 for the race, for a total of $304,500,000 or $152,250,000 per year for the two-year
election cycle.
There are 100 Senate races in every six-year cycle. We again estimate seven primary candidates for
a total of 700 candidates. Each candidate gets $100,000 plus an additional $50,000 for every congressional
district in the state. Thus 700 candidates x $100,000 = $70 million, plus 435 congressional districts x
$50,000 = $21,750,000 x 7 candidates per district = $152,250,000. This totals $222,250,000 per six year
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These figures are obviously rough estimates. The institution of Democrati-
cally Financed Elections may encourage even more qualified candidates than
our estimate anticipates. But compared with the billions of dollars monied
interests currently wrest from Congress in the form of corporate and industry
bailouts, tax breaks, subsidies, regulatory exemptions, and other forms of
special interest legislation, the cost to the taxpayer for total public funding of
all federal elections would represent real savings. 9
IV. POLITICAL PROSPECTS
The American public seems open to the idea of campaign finance reform,
although its ideas about the specifics are unfocused and inchoate. Recent polls
and focus groups indicate that many Americans fully understand the corrupting
influence that campaign contributions from private sources have on our electo-
ral system, and that they would support comprehensive measures to reform
the electoral process. 9'
The ideals of democracy-equal political opportunity, fair and honest
elections, and government accountability-still resonate in the American
culture. Democratically Financed Elections could be the cutting edge of a
cycle, or a total yearly cost of the Senate primary of $37,041,000.
Congressional General Election: For the House, we estimate 1,000 candidates (870 major-party and
130 third-party candidates) at a cost of $150,000 a race for a total of $150 million or $75 million for each
year of the two-year cycle.
For the Senate, we estimate 250 candidates (200 major-party plus 50 third-party candidates per six-year
election cycle). Each candidate is awarded $150,000 plus $75,000 per congressional district. Thus, 250
candidates x $150,000 = $37,500,000, plus 435 congressional districts x $75,000 per candidate x 2.5
candidates per race = $119,062,500 per six-year cycle, or $19,843,700 per year.
Under these assumptions, publicly financed candidates would get $284,134,700 for their primary and
general election campaigns. Add to this the additional funds that some of these candidates will need to
match independent expenditures waged against them and to match the excess spending of privately financed
candidates. Further add the administrative costs of the Federal Election Commission. Its 1990 budget was
$18,808,000. But as the FEC will no longer have to monitor thousands of separate contributions from
private citizens and political action committees, and the expenditures of the publicly financed candidates
will be monitored electronically by the credit card system, the FEC's operating costs, after the system is
established, could conceivably go down.
94. See, e.g., A Case of Legal Corruption, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 7, 1988, at 20-23;
What Dollars Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 7, 1988, at 23-24 (describing "the 15 most
egregious congressional boondoggles" in which special interests received billions of dollars in Congress-
approved favors as payment, the magazine charges, for campaign contributions to influential members).
For major muckraking treatments of this issue, see BROOKS JACKSON, supra note 76, and STERN, Supra
note 49.
95. For example, in one recent poll, 85% said that campaign contributions buy the loyalty of
candidates for public office; 83% thought that campaign contribution of special interests have more
influence than the voters; and 74% believe that Congress is largely owned by the special interests. GORDON
S. BLACK, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DISCONTENT: A STUDY OF VOTER DISCONTENT 9-11 (1992).
Although public financing, because it means giving taxpayer money to political candidates, has always
been considered a "hard sell," 79% said they would support public financing of congressional elections
if it would encourage better candidates to run against incumbents, and 76% would support public financing
if it was tied to the elimination of PAC contributions. Id.
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genuinely patriotic movement to revitalize and make good on the promise of
American democracy. By denying the rich the ability to vote with their money,
ordinary voters would achieve the political power that is rightfully theirs.
Ballots rather than dollars would determine who gets elected, what kind of
public policies our legislators enact, and the measure of justice by which our
country is run.
The proposal for Democratically Financed Elections, like the Nineteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Bill of 1965, is a radical one. By its very
boldness it recalls the visionary principles on which this country was founded.
As Thomas Paine wrote in Common Sense: "a long habit of not thinking a
thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right and raises at first
a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time
makes more converts than reason. "96
96. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 1 (1776).
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